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AMERICAN BAR
tends the requirement of publication by requiring "exercises of legislative
power by executive or administrative officials" to be registered and pub-
lished before becoming effective except in the case of emergency matters.
The idea of the administrative tribunal proposed by the committee is
not entirely new. Senator Mills M. Logan of Kentucky introduced in the
73rd Congress a bill which was similar to, though not as comprehensive as,
the one proposed by the Committee. The Committee report contemplates
an amalgamation of the Court of Claims, Board of Tax Appeals, and Custom
Courts into the new tribunal, which would also have jurisdiction over certain
cases now falling within the scope of the United States District and Circuit
Courts and Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
Briefly, the plan provides for a court having two divisions-trial and
appellate. These divisions would be divided into sections, one for each
major subject. Appeals would lie from the trial division to the appellate
division on questions of law. Final appeal would be made directly to the
United States Supreme Court by certiorari or on certificate of the appellate
division. The objective to be obtained in this matter, says the report, would
be an "efficient judicial review" but one which will not burden the United
States Supreme Court.
While headquarters would be in Washington, D. C., the divisions and
sections of the court would be "ambulatory" with power to hold hearings
anywhere in the United States. This mobile feature of the court would be
enhanced by making United States District and Circuit Court judges com-
petent to sit on the court wherever necessary.
The present officials on the abolished bodies would become the judges
of the administrative court. The tenure of office, salary, and powers of thejudges, and the personnel would be similar to the existing federal court
set-up. The court would have power to make its own rules of practice and!
procedure; and it would be a court of record. Yearly reports would be
made by the court to Congress.
Tribute to Justice Holmes*
(Remarks by REPRESENTATIVE PETTENGILL on the floor of the
House of Representatives)
Mr. Speaker, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is dead. The great dis-
senter is gone. He dissented from old thought patterns in favor of new
ones. It is my belief that if his dissents of 10, 20, 30 years ago had been
accepted .as the true guide posts to our development, much of the trouble to-
day would have been spared us. "Holmes and Brandeis dissent." Historic
words!
From my days in law school he has been a sort of spiritual godfather
of mine. This is not the time to appraise his achievement, but it is certain,
as he once said, "We will leave our spirit in those who follow, and they will
not turn back. All is ready; bugler, blow the charge."
On the day that his death is announced to the world I would like to
point out just one, perhaps the major part of his creed-his belief in ex-
periment.
Justice Holmes knew that growth is the law of life; that only change
is changeless; that "time makes ancient good uncouth"; that men must be
free to pioneer new pathways to new El Dorados.
*Reprinted from the Congressional Record, March 6, 1935, pp. 3142-3.
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Justice Holmes always believed in a new deal. He would, without
doubt, have upheld the major purposes of the "new deal" of today. For 94
years he remained "invincibly young," as Justice Hughes once said. He
brought to the Nation's altar the winnowed wisdom of years, but his heart
was a boy's heart to the end. He never put life in a pigeon hold, nor the
Constitution in a strait-jacket.
This is easily proved by his own words and I here set down "little frag-
ments of my fleece that I have left upon the hedges of life."
In the first chapter of his first book, The Common Law, he said: "The
life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience," and of course
experience comes from experiment.
Again-
"The provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas hav-
ing their essence in their form; they are organic living institutions trans-
planted from English soil. Their significance is vital, not formal."
Again-
"The fourteenth amendment (and he would have said the same thing of
any other part) is not a pedagogical requirement of the impracticable."
Again-
"The fact is that legislation in this country, as well as elsewhere, is
empirical."
Again-
"There is nothing I more deprecate than the use of the fourteenth
amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the
making of social experiments that an important part of the community
desires, in the insulated chambers afforded by several States, even though
the experiments may seem futile or even noxious to me and to those whose
judgment I most respect."
Again-
"If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls
for attachment than any other, it is the principle of free thought-not free
thought for those who agree with us, but freedom for the thought that
we hate.
"We see nothing in the Constitution that compels the Government to sit
by while a food supply is cut off and the protectors of our forests and our
crops are destroyed.
"As any line of adjustment between conflicting rights must be drawn
on practical grounds, there is no doubt that it may vary under different
circumstances . For instance, in England, in view of the national importance
of their great manufacturers, juries are instructed that, in counties where
great works are carried on, parties must not stand on extreme rights.
"When 20 years ago a vague terror went over the earth and the word
'socialism' began to be heard, I thought, and still think that fear was trans-
lated into doctrines that had no proper place in the Constitution or the
common law. Judges are apt to be naif, simple-minded men, and they need
something of Mephistopheles. We, too, need education in the obvious-to
learn to transcend our own convictions and to leave room for much that
we hold dear to be done away with, short of revolution, by orderly change
of the law.
"We know too much to sacrifice good sense to syllogism.
"The law is the witness and external deposits of our moral life. Its
history is the moral development of the race."
RECENT CASE NOTES
He believed in the "oughtness" of the law.
Many more like these few excerpts from his wisdom might be given,
but these are here set down "in order that we may remember all that buffoons
forget." He did not believe in wild swings of the pendulum because he
once said, "Historic continuity with the past is not a duty, it is only a
necessity." But he did believe that the past is not the present nor the
present the future.
He once wrote to a Hoosier friend of mine, Oswald Ryan, of the
Federal Power Commission:
"Life is a romantic business. It is painting a picture, not doing a sum;
but you have to make the romance. And it will come to the question, How
much fire have you in your belly ?"
As he once said of an associate who had passed on, so we may say
of him:
"Sooner or later the race of men will die, but we demand an external
record. We have it. What we have done is woven forever in the great
vibrating web of the world. The eye that can read the import of its motion
can decipher the story of all our deeds, of all our thoughts. To that eye I
am content to leave the recognition and memory of this great head and
heart."
RECENT CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law--Contract Clause-Emergency Legislation. Thomas,
by garnishment proceedings, impressed a lien upon funds payable to Mrs.
Worthen as beneficiary of a life insurance policy carried by her deceased
husband. Garnishment was taken in satisfaction of a judgment debt upon
a contract between Mrs. Worthen and Thomas. Subsequent to imposition
of the lien, the Arkansas legislature enacted an exemption of money paid
or payable to beneficiaries under insurance policies from seizure through
the judicial process for the amortization of any contract debt. Held, The
statute is unconstitutional as a civil, retroactive law transgressing the consti-
tutional prohibition that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation
of a contract.1
The contract clause was -zonceived as a constitutional subsidy to the
infant credit structure of these United States. It was a permanent protest
against those legislative schemes for the obliteration of debts which issued
from the states during the depressed epoch that followed the War of Inde-
pendence. Both the historical justification presented by Mr. Justice
Marshall 2 and the political argument of the Federalist Papers 3 reveal that,
"The power of changing the relative situation of debtor and creditor, of
interfering with contracts . . . had been used to such an excess by the
state legislatures, as to break in upon the ordinary intercourse of society, and
destroy all confidence between man and man".4 It follows that the social
interest which the contract clause protects is the stability of promises, the
"private faith" and confidence that is credit. No amount of legal sanction,
however, can insure the fulfillment of contractual obligation.
1 W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas (1934), 292 U. S. 426.
2 Sturges v. Crowninshield (1819), 4 Wheat. 122.
3 Madison, Federalist Papers, No. 44.
4 Ogden v. Saunders (1827), 12 Wheat. 213.
